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ABSTRACT 
Electronic Mail (E-Mail), which is one of the most widely used applications of 
Internet, has become a global communication infrastructure service.  However, 
security loopholes in it enable cybercriminals to misuse it by forging its headers 
or by sending it anonymously for illegitimate purposes, leading to e-mail 
forgeries. E-mail messages include transit handling envelope and trace 
information in the form of structured fields which are not stripped after messages 
are delivered, leaving a detailed record of e-mail transactions.  A detailed header 
analysis can be used to map the networks traversed by messages, including 
information on the messaging software and patching policies of clients and 
gateways, etc. Cyber forensic e-mail analysis is employed to collect credible 
evidence to bring criminals to justice. This paper projects the need for e-mail 
forensic investigation and lists various methods and tools used for its realization. 
A detailed header analysis of a multiple tactic spoofed e-mail message is carried 
out in this paper. It also discusses various possibilities for detection of spoofed 
headers and identification of its originator. Further, difficulties that may be faced 
by investigators during forensic investigation of an e-mail message have been 
discussed along with their possible solutions. 
Keywords: E-mail Headers, E-mail Forensic, E-mail Analysis, E-mail spoofing, 
E-mail Investigation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
E-mail is a highly distributed service that involves several actors which play 
different roles to accomplish end-to-end e-mail exchange (Crocke 2009). These 
actors fall under three groups namely User Actors, Message Handling Service 
(MHS) Actors and ADministrative Management Domain (ADMD) Actors. User 
Actors are Authors, Recipients, Return Handlers and Mediators which represent 
people, organizations or processes that serve as sources or sinks of messages. 
They can generate, modify or look at the whole message. Message Handling 
Service (MHS) Actors are Originators, Relays, Gateways and Receivers which are 
responsible for end-to-end transfer of messages. These Actors can generate, 
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modify or look at only transfer data in the message. ADministrative Management 
Domain (ADMD) Actors are Edges, Consumers and Transits which are associated 
with different organizations and have their own administrative authority, 
operating policies and trust-based decision making. E-mail system is an 
integration of several hardware & software components, services and protocols, 
which provide interoperability between its users and among the components along 
the path of transfer. The system includes sender’s client and server computers and 
receiver’s client and server computers with required software and services 
installed on each. Besides, it uses various systems and services of the Internet. 
The sending and receiving servers are always connected to the Internet but the 
sender’s and receiver’s client connects to the Internet as and when required. 
Cyber forensics deals with the collection and analysis of data from computer 
systems, networks, wired or wireless communication streams and storage media 
through scientifically proven techniques in a manner admissible in a court of law 
(Natarajan et al. 2009). It is also called digital forensics and computer forensics. 
Network forensics is the science that deals with capture, recording, and analysis 
of network traffic for investigation purpose and incident response (Emmanuel et 
al. 2010). E-mail forensics dealing with the investigation of e-mail message is a 
specialized type of network forensics which in turn is also a specialized type of 
cyber forensics. It refers to the study of source and content of e-mail message as 
evidence to identify the actual sender and recipient of a message, data/time of 
transmission, detailed record of e-mail transaction, intent of the sender, etc. This 
study involves investigation of metadata, keyword searching, port scanning, etc. 
for authorship attribution and identification of e-mail scams. 
1. E-MAIL FORENSIC INVESTIGATION 
E-mail forensics refers to the study of source and content of e-mail message as 
evidence, identification of the actual sender, recipient, date and time when it was 
sent, etc. Forensic analysis of an e-mail message aims at discovering the history of 
a message and identity of all involved entities. Besides message analysis, e-mail 
forensic also involves investigation of some client or server computer suspected 
of being used or misused for e-mail forgery. It may involve inspection of Internet 
favorites, Cookies, History, Typed URL’s, Temporary Internet Files, Auto-
completion Entries, Bookmarks, Contacts, Preferences, Cache, etc. Several Open 
Source software tools have also been developed to perform e-mail header analysis 
to collect evidence of e-mail fraud. 
E-mail analysis begins from the recipient’s mailbox which contains the e-mail 
message. The message is analysed to determine the source (originator and 
author). The analysis involves investigation of both control information (envelope 
and header) and message body. Mailbox, domain name, message-ID and ENVID 
are globally unique identities that are used in e-mail.  The Mailbox is identified by 
an e-mail address and domain name is an identifier of an Internet resource. 
Message-ID is used for threading, aiding identification for duplications and 
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Domain Name System (DNS) tracking. The ENVelope Identifier (ENVID) is used 
for the purpose of message tracking. E-mail message comprises of envelope that 
contains transit-handling information used by the Message Handling Service 
(MHS) and message content which consists of two parts namely Body and 
Header. The Body is text but can also include multimedia elements in Hyper Text 
Markup Language (HTML) and attachments encoded in Multi-Purpose Internet 
Mail Extensions (MIME) (Resnick 2001). The Header is a structured set of fields 
that include ‘From’, ‘To’, ‘Subject’, ‘Date’, ‘CC’, ‘BCC’, ‘Return-To’, etc. 
Headers are included in the message by the sender or by a component of the e-
mail system and also contain transit-handling trace information. Further, the 
message also contains special control data pertaining to Delivery Status (DS) and 
Message Disposition Notifications (MDN), etc. The control information i.e. 
envelope and headers including headers in the message body that contain 
information about the sender and/or the path along which the message has 
traversed represents the metadata of an e-mail message. The analysis of this 
metadata called header analysis can be used to determine genuineness of a 
message.  
The e-mail address of sender responsible for submitting the message to the 
transfer service is specified in the Sender header field. This field is optional and 
needs to be specified only if the author of the message is different from the 
sender. The e-mail address of the author is contained in the mandatory From 
header field. Various other addresses related to author or sender of the message, 
are addresses specified in Reply-To, MailFrom and Return-Path fields. Address 
specified in Reply-To header overrides the From address for responses from 
recipients if specified. MailFrom specifies the address for receiving return control 
information like MDN and DSN. This address need not to be the same as that of 
author or sender responsible for submitting the message. Return-Path address is 
the address recorded by MDA from MailFrom control identifier. E-mail client 
programs and webmail interfaces add useful headers called X-Headers which 
besides other information contain useful information about the sender or author of 
the e-mail. A comparison of these addresses in all cases cannot be used to 
determine the genuineness of a sender or author because it is possible to spoof all 
of these addresses and thus not only hide one’s address but also pretend to be 
somebody else by using another’s  valid e-mail address in these fields. Trace 
information in the form of Received header field recorded by originator, relay, 
mediator or destination may be used to validate only the domain part of the 
sender’s or author’s e-mail address. Received-SPF also cannot validate the e-mail 
address of a sender or author as it can only validate domain of address specified in 
MailFrom parameter. DKIM-Signature security field if present may be used to 
validate the domain part of the sender’s or author’s e-mail address if the sending 
and receiving servers are following DKIM signing protocol. Thus, on the basis of 
inconsistencies of sender’s identity as may be revealed by various header fields, 
forensic experts can only make a wider guess about the genuineness of the 
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sender’s e-mail address and not a final decision. Originator, Relay including MTA, 
and Receiver add trace information at the beginning of the message which is in 
the form of Received and Return-Path header fields.  Received header field 
specifies the address used in MailFrom parameter and may not be much useful for 
forensic investigation. The Received field contains vital information including 
names and IP addresses of originating host, relays or MTA’s, Mediators and 
MSA’s. However, it is also possible to spoof the IP address reported in this field 
by the use or misuse of various techniques mentioned in section 2. 
Besides header analysis various other approaches that can be used for e-mail 
forensics include bait tactics, server investigations, and network device 
investigation. Custom and MIME headers appearing in the body of the message 
are also analysed for sender mailer fingerprints and software embedded identifiers 
(Marwan 2005). 
Various software tools have been developed to assist e-mail forensic 
investigation. These include eMailTrackerPro (http://www.emailtrackerpro. 
com/), EmailTracer (http://www.cyber forensics. in), Adcomplain 
(http://www.rdrop.com/users/billmc/adcomplain.html), Aid4Mail Forensic 
(http://www.aid4mail.com/), AbusePipe (http://www.datamystic.com/ abusepipe. 
html), AccessData’s FTK (www.accessdata.com/), EnCase Forensic (http://www. 
guidancesoftware.com), FINALeMAIL (http://finaldata2. com), Sawmill-
GroupWise (http://www.sawmill.net), Forensics Investigation Toolkit (FIT) 
(http://www.edecision4u. com/FIT.html), Paraben (Network) E-mail Examiner 
(http://www.paraben.com/email-examiner.html), etc. These analyse headers of e-
mail messages to detect the IP address of the originating machine. These tools 
often have abuse reporting features, e-mail classification option, support multiple 
encryption techniques like Credant, SafeBoot, Utimaco, EFS, PGP, Guardian 
Edge, Sophos Enterprise and S/MIME. Its current supported e-mail types are: 
Lotus Notes NSF, Outlook PST/OST, Exchange EDB, Outlook Express DBX, 
Eudora, EML (Microsoft Internet Mail, Earthlink, Thunderbird, Quickmail, etc.), 
Netscape, AOL and RFC 833. Some of these claim to be vetted by courts as 
standard digital investigation platforms.  
2. NEED FOR E-MAIL FORENSIC INVESTIGATION 
Cybercriminals spoof e-mail messages to carry out various illegitimate activities 
through e-mail system and remain underground to evade any possible legal action 
against them. These include i) abuses like spamming, phishing, cyber bullying, 
child pornography, sexual harassment, racial vilification, etc., ii) misuse by 
transmitting viruses, worms, Trojan horses, hoaxes, and other malicious programs 
with an intent to spread them over Internet, and iii) carry out Internet 
infrastructure crimes through Denial of Services and Directory Harvesting 
Attacks. This injudicious use of e-mail cause many technological problems like 
misuse of storage space, wastage of computational resources, and network 
conjunction.  Cybercriminals misuse SMTP to lie recipients about their true 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(2) 
 
53 
 
identities by not only spoofing one or more headers in the envelope or header of 
the message that somehow reveals their identity but also put misleading 
information in these headers. A highly technical spammer or phisher may also 
evade packet filters and spoof the source IP address of their packets to indicate 
that the message is from a trusted domain (Hastings et al. 1996).  
Senders can lie about their true identities in various ways by using or misusing 
different techniques that include: 
i. Spoofing: (Radvanovsky 2006) It is an attempt to conceal the 
source of an e-mail message by placing false information in its 
headers. All possibilities to lie about true identities of sender listed 
above lead to spoofing. E-mail spoofing may be combined with IP 
spoofing to make its detection very difficult. 
ii. Unauthorized Networks: (Shunman et al. 2003) Wired or wireless 
networks that have been compromised by perpetrators to gain 
unauthorized access to the Internet can disguise their identities 
while sending an e-mail. 
iii. Open Mail Relays: (Shue et al. 2009) An open mail relay is a mis-
configured mail relay that accepts mail form any computer and 
forwards it to another computer which otherwise should have 
accepted mail for and from specific computers. Such a relay 
becomes vulnerable to spammers and phishers who hide their 
identities behind these relays. 
iv. Annomizers or re-mailers: (Cherry, 2001) Re-mailers are websites 
that operate under the guise of protecting privacy of Internet users 
offering anonymous Internet surfing. They intentionally strip 
headers from e-mail and some even do not maintain server logs.  
v. Open Proxy: (Vivek et al. 2004) A proxy server is a machine that 
allows computers to connect through it to some other computer on 
the Internet. HTTP proxy server provided by ISPs, Corporate Proxy 
Server, transparent proxy server, and Open proxy server also called 
anonymous proxy server are different types of proxy servers which 
provide different levels of anonymity. Users connecting to Internet 
through these proxy servers share IP address. An Open proxy server 
does not maintain a strict log of user activities unlike others which 
maintain user logs synchronized with reliable time servers. Such 
open proxy servers provide anonymity and untraceable Internet 
activity.  
vi. SSH Tunnel or Port-Redirector: (Dusi 2008) A Tunnel in Internet 
means a secure data path through an un-trusted network. Depending 
upon the software and techniques used, tunneling can be 
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accomplished through many ways. SSH also has a feature called 
SSH Port Forwarding, sometimes called SSH Tunneling, which 
allows establishing a secure SSH session and then tunneling 
arbitrary TCP connections through it. SSH Tunneling is an 
encrypted tunnel created using the SSH protocol connection. SSH 
Tunnels can be used by e-mail senders to hide their identities. 
vii. Botnets: (Banday et al. 2009)  The term bot, derived from “ro-bot” 
in its generic form is used to describe a script or set of scripts or a 
program designed to perform predefined functions repeatedly and 
automatically after being triggered intentionally or through a system 
infection.  Although bots originated as a useful feature for carrying 
out repetitive and time consuming operations but they are being 
exploited for malicious intent. Bots that are used to carry out 
legitimate activities in an automated manner are called benevolent 
bots and those that are meant for malicious intent are known as 
malicious bots. A botnet is a network of bots controlled by a 
botmaster. A botmaster can command its controlled bots (malicious 
bots) running on compromised computers across the globe to send 
e-mail to some designated addresses while concealing its identity 
and committing some e-mail fraud. 
viii. Untraceable Internet Connections: (Berthold et al. 2000; 
Landsiedel et al. 2005) Public and corporate Internet access points 
like cyber cafe, university campus, business organization, etc. 
provide Internet access to its users by shearing Internet connection. 
If a proper log of activity is not maintained, its users can easily 
conceal their identity to do illegal cyber activities including e-mail 
fraud without any fear of being traced. 
Protocols offering security and anti-spam filters that are capable to perform mail 
categorization have been developed to secure e-mail service against sender-
spoofing. Security protocols that add privacy to SMTP either create encrypted 
secure channel between the sender and the receiver during SMTP transactions or 
use end to end symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic schemes. Further, various 
domain validation anti-spoofing standards using either IP addresses or digital 
signatures to validate sending domain have also been developed that help an e-
mail system at the receiving end to detect the spoofing of addresses and as such 
enables it to decide how to handle incoming e-mails. A detailed record of e-mal 
security protocols and procedures along with the functioning of some prominent 
security protocols is given in (Banday 2010b).  Very limited numbers of e-mail 
users use these protocols to secure their e-mails due to either their limited 
technical skill or unawareness about their existence (Banday 2010a)]. Further, 
their use has not been made mandatory and as such unwillingness of some ESP’s 
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does also limit their use. Furthermore, spammers constantly change spam sending 
techniques and its structure to evade security procedures and protocols, leaving 
scope for e-mail forgery and e-mail crime raising the need for e-mail forensic 
analysis. Forensic investigation of an e-mail message can be carried out by the use 
of various techniques and software tools. However, these techniques and tools 
may prove to be ineffective to identify the e-mail forgery or the actor responsible 
for it. This is because analysis through various techniques discussed above can 
halt due to lack of co-operation between different service providers. Further, 
invention of new means and changing tactics of the cybercriminals make e-mail 
forensic an active area of research thereby making it necessary to analyse e-mail 
messages for any possible forgery.   
3. ANALYZING AN E-MAIL MESSAGE 
A sample header set of an e-mail message sent by tariq@tariq.com pretending to 
be alice@alice.com and sent to bob@bob.com is shown in table 1. In this e-mail, 
the sender’s address, date e-mail was sent, reply-to address, and various other 
fields have been spoofed.  The identification identities like domain name, IP 
address, etc. which could have revealed servers used in the process of sending the 
e-mail have been suitably edited. This header set is used to demonstrate the 
information contained in various headers of the message. 
Table 1: Sample header set of an e-mail message            
 Para  
No Header Value 
1 X-Apparently-To: bob@bob.com via a4.b4.c4.d4; Tue, 30 Nov 2010 07:36:34 -0800 
2 Return-Path: < alice@alice.com > 
3 
Received-SPF: 
none (mta1294.mail.mud.bob.com: domain of 
alice@alice.com does not designate permitted 
sender hosts) 
4 X-Spam-Ratio: 3.2
5 X-Originating-IP: [a2.b2.c2.d2] 
6 X-Sieve: CMU Sieve 2.3 
7 X-Spam-Charsets: Plain=’utf-8’ html=’utf-8’ 
8 X-Resolved-To: bob@bob.com 
9 X-Delivered-To: bob@bob.com 
10 X-Mail-From: alice@alice.com 
11 Authentication-
Results: 
mta1294.mail.mud.bob.com from=alice.com; 
domainkeys=neutral (no sig); from=alice.com; 
dkim=neutral (no sig) 
12 Received: from 127.0.0.1 (EHLO mailbox-us-s-7b.tariq.com) (a2.b2.c2.d2) by mta1294.mail.mud.bob.com with 
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 Para  
No Header Value 
SMTP; Tue, 30 Nov 2010 07:36:34 -0800 
13 
Received: 
from MTBLAPTOP (unknown [a1.b1.c1.d1]) 
(Authenticated sender: tariq@tariq.com) by 
mailbox-us-s-7b.tariq.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA 
id 8F0AE139002E for <bob@bob.com>; Tue, 30 
Nov 2010 15:36:23 +0000 (GMT) 
14 From: "Allice" <Alice@a.com>   
15 Subject: A Sample Mail Message 
16 To: "Bob Jones" <bob@bob.com> 
17 
Content-Type: 
multipart/alternative; charset="utf-8"; 
boundary="KnRl8MgwQQWMSCW6Q5=_HgI2hw
Adah5NLY" 
18 MIME-Version: 1.0 
19 Content-Transfer-
Encoding: 8bit 
20 Content-Length: 511 
21 Reply-To: "Smith" <smith@smith.com> 
22 Organization: Alices Organization 
23 Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2010 21:06:22 +0530 
24 Return-Receipt-
To: smith@smith.com 
25 Disposition-
Notification-To: jones@jones.com 
26 Message-Id: <20101130153623.8F0AE139002E@mailbox-us-s-7b.tariq.com> 
 
The Header X-Apparently-To shown in Para 1 is relevant when mail has been sent 
as a BCC or to recipients of some mailing list. This field in most of the cases 
contain the address as in To field. But if mail has been sent to a BCC recipient or 
a mailing list, X-Apparently-To is different from TO field. Some may show TO 
while others may not show it. Thus X-Apparently-To always shows the e-mail 
address of recipient regardless of whether mail has been sent using TO, BCC, CC 
addresses or by the use of some mailing list.   
The Return-Path header is the e-mail address of the mailbox specified by the 
sender in the MailFrom command. This address can also be spoofed, if no 
authentication mechanism is in place at the sending server as has been done in the 
sample e-mail shown at Para 2 in Table 1. It is not possible to determine 
genuineness of Return-Path header through header analysis alone. 
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The header shown in Para 3 is the Received-SPF, the value of which specifies that 
the mail has come from a domain which either does not have a SPF record or is 
not yet a designated permitted sender.  
The spam score calculated by the spam filtering software of the receiving server 
or MUA is contained in X-Spam-Ratio field. This value for the e-mail under study 
is 3.2 as shown in Para 4. If this ratio exceeds certain pre-defined threshold, e-
mail will be classified as spam. Different receiving servers and MUA’s used 
different X-Header fields to indicate spam score and classification decision taken 
with regard to the current message. These include X-Spam-Flag, X-Spam-
Checker-Version, X-Spam-Level, X-Spam-Status, etc. 
X-Originating-IP specified the IP address of the last MTA of the sending SMTP 
Server, which has delivered the e-mail to the server of bob@bob.com. In the 
sample e-mail it is [a2.b2.c2.d2] as shown in Para 5. This address is also 
contained in the Received header field. 
X-Sieve header specifies the name and version of message filtering system. This 
pertains to the scripting language used to specify conditions for message filtering 
and handling. In the sample e-mail the name of the message filtering software is 
CMU Sieve and its version is 2.3. 
X-Spam-Charsets header specifies the character set used for filtering the 
messages. The value for this field in sample e-mail at Para 7 indicates that 8-bit 
Unicode Transformation Format (UTF) has been used by bob’s server. UTF is a 
variable length character set having a special property of being backward-
compatible to ASCII. 
X-Resolved-To address is the e-mail address of the mailbox to which the mail has 
been delivered by MDA of bob’s server. In most cases, it is the same as X-
Delivered-To field. X-Delivered-To is the address of the mailbox to which the 
mail has been delivered by MDA of bob’s server. In the sample e-mail both X-
Resolved-To and X-Delivered-To addresses are bob@bob.com as in Paras 8 and 9.  
X-Mail-From header specifies the e-mail address of the mailbox specified by the 
sender in the MailFrom command which in the sample e-mail is alice@alice.com. 
The Authentication-Results header in Para 11 indicates that 
mta1294.mail.mud.bob.com received mail from alice.com domain which neither 
has DomainKeys signature nor DKIM signature. 
Para 12 is the second Received header field containing the trace information 
indicating 127.0.0.1 as the IP address of the machine that send the message. This 
machine is actually named mailbox-us-s-7b.tariq.com and has IP address 
a2.b2.c2.d2. It has used EHLO SMTP command to send the mail. The mail was 
received by mta1294.mail.mud.bob.com using SMTP. The message has been 
received on Tue, 30 Nov 2010 date at 07:36:34 time. The clock is 8 hrs behind 
Greenwich Mean Time. 
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Para 13 is the first Received header field representing the trace information 
indicating MTBLAPTOP as the names of the machine that send the message. This 
machine is not known to the receiver but has an IP address a1.b1.c1.d1 and 
tariq@tariq.com is the owner of the mailbox who has sent the message. The 
MTA must follow some authentication mechanism to identify its mailbox users 
otherwise it is not possible to include authenticated sender’s mailbox address with 
the Received field. The message has been received by mailbox-us-s-7b.tariq.com 
using ESMTPA protocol which has been running a program called Postfix. The 
message is for bob@bob.com and has an ID of 8F0AE139002E. The message has 
been received on Tue, 30 Nov 2010 at 15:36:23. The clock is set according to 
Greenwich Mean Time. 
The From, Subject and To lines respectively are the e-mail address of the author, 
subject of the message, and the e-mail address of the intended recipient. Subject 
and To are specified by the sender, and the From address is taken by the system 
from the current logged in user. However, From header can very easily be 
spoofed as has been dome in this sample e-mail. The paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 in 
the sample e-mail show the values of these three fields. The From address has 
been spoofed to carry an address Alice@a.com with a user friendly name Alice. 
Content-Type, MIME-Version, Content-Transfer-Encoding and Content-length in 
paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 are the MIME headers describing the type of MIME 
content, transfer encoding, its version and length so that the MUA’s can perform 
proper decoding to render the message successfully on client. 
This is the address, sender of this e-mail wants recipient to use for sending reply 
in response to this e-mail. Normally, this is used by the senders to send replies. 
Carefully crafted sender spoofing combined with fake Reply-To e-mail address 
can lead to serious information leaks. The Reply-To address "Smith" 
smith@smith.com in Para 21 is an arbitrary address that may belong to some user 
who may not be related to the sender in any way. 
Organization header field indicates that the organization of claimed sender is 
Alices Organization. Organization header field is an information field 
representing the organization of a sender. It can be misused by the spammer to 
give a false impression about a sender as has been done in this e-mail. 
Date header indicates that the e-mail was composed and submitted for delivery on 
Tue, 28 Nov 2010 21:06:22 +0530, which is not in conformity with the date in 
the Received field of Para 23. 
Return-Receipt-To field indicates the e-mail address, MSA, MTA and MDA must 
use for sending delivery notifications such as successful or failure notifications. 
The address mentioned for this field in Para 24 is again an arbitrary address that 
may belong to some user who may not be related to the sender in any way. 
Disposition-Notification-To field indicates an e-mail address, MUA must use 
when submitting a message indicating that the message has been displayed. This 
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address specified in Para 25 is also an arbitrary address that does belong to some 
user who may not be related to the sender in any way. 
Para 26 contains the Message-Id of the message which is 
20101130153623.8F0AE139002E@mailbox-us-s-7b.tariq.com. Generally, a 
domain name is appended with a unique number by the sending server to form the 
Message-Id. 
4. DISCUSSIONS 
In the above sample e-mail message, several fields have been spoofed which can 
be detected easily because the first Received field shows the address of 
authenticated sender which is different from the sender of the message. However, 
address of authenticated sender may not be always included with the 
authentication results (in case no authentication mechanism is adhered to or 
annomizers strip this line). Further, date is also inconsistent as can be noted from 
the comparison of timestamp in Received headers and the date field. Some header 
fields with context to authentication and above analysed e-mail message are 
discussed further hereunder: 
SPF mechanisms can be used to describe the set of hosts which are designated 
outbound mailers for the domain. The test besides success or failure may also 
result into softfail, neutral, none, permerror or temperror. For example, a 
successful Received-SPF entry could be as follows: 
Received-SPF: pass (mta1104.mail.mud.tariq.com: domain of 
tariq@tariq.com designates a2.b2.c2.d2 as permitted sender) 
 
Here, the mta1104.mail.mud.tariq.com MTA notifies its recipient through 
Received-SPF that domain of tariq@tariq.com i.e. tariq.com which has an IP 
address a2.b2.c2.d2 is a permitted sender designated by Sender Policy 
Framework (Wong 2006). 
In case, the domain alice.com had been DomainKeys and DKIM complaint and 
had passed these tests, it could have been as follows:  
Authentication-Results: mta1294.mail.mud.bob.com from=alice.com; 
domainkeys=pass (ok); from=a.com; dkim=pass (ok) 
 
In this case, it could have included DKIM-Signature (Allma et al. 2007) and/or 
DomainKey-Signature fields as follows: 
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=simple; d=alice.com; 
h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:content-type q=dns/txt; s=s512; 
bh=XX…………=; b=XXX………==; 
 
This is the DKIM Signature signed with SHA1 algorithm. DKIM uses the email 
headers and body to generate a signature. If the headers are rewritten or text is 
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appended to the message body after it has been signed, the DKIM verification 
fails. DKIM is backward compatible with the DomainKeys system. When an e-
mail message is signed with DKIM, it will include a number of “tags” whose 
values contain authenticating data for the message being sent. In the example 
above, the tags used are:  
v= This tag defines the version of this specification that applies to the 
signature record. 
a= The algorithm used to generate the signature (plain-text; 
REQUIRED).  It supports "rsa-sha1" and "rsa-sha256", Signers 
usually sign using "rsa-sha256". 
c= It is the canonicalization algorithm 1.e. the method by which the 
headers and content are prepared for presentation to the signing 
algorithm. 
d= It is the domain name of the signing domain. 
h= It is a colon-separated list of header field names that identify the  
header fields presented to the signing algorithm. 
q= It specifies the query method used to retrieve the public key which 
by default is dns. 
s= It is the selector used in the public key. 
bh= The signature data or public key, encoded as a Base64 string. 
The example of DomainKeys signature is given below. DomainKeys signature 
has been signed with SHA1 algorithm. 
DomainKeys-Signature: a= rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=simple; s=s512; 
d=alice.com; b=XXX……………………………==; 
When an e-mail message is signed with DomainKeys, it will include a number of 
“tags” whose values contain authenticating data for the message being sent. In the 
example above, the tags used are:  
a= It is the encryption algorithm used to generate the signature which by 
default is "rsa-sha1". 
q= It specifies the query method used to retrieve the public key which by 
default is dns. 
c= It is the canonicalization algorithm 1.e. the method by which the 
headers and content are prepared for presentation to the signing 
algorithm. 
s= It is the selector used in the public key. 
d= It is the domain name of the signing domain. 
b= The signature data or public key, encoded as a Base64 string. 
Date header represents the date e-mail was composed and submitted for delivery. 
However, this filed can also be spoofed (Banday 2010a) as has been done in this 
sample e-mail message. It can be easily noticed by comparing its value in Para 23 
with the dates in the Received header fields. 
Message-Id is the message Identification attached to the e-mail message. Every e-
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mail has a unique message ID that helps the administrators to locate the e-mail in 
server log. Usually every sending server uses its own custom algorithm to 
generate this unique number and append domain name to this to make it unique 
on the internet. This ID can also help to identify the domain of the sender but it 
can also be forged to confuse the investigators. 
The first Received header field representing the trace information contains the IP 
address of the machine used to send the e-mail message. On tracking this IP 
address several cases as explained below are possible: 
i. The IP address in the Received header field maps to direct 
connection having a static IP address. In this case, this address is 
the address of the sender’s computer. However, if the IP address is 
dynamic then the logs of the proxy or SMTP server need to be 
obtained for continuing the e-mail tracking.  
ii. The IP address contained in the Received header corresponds to 
some proxy server. In this case, proxy server’s log must be obtained 
to track the sender. Open proxy server may raise some issues for the 
investigators because they do not maintain a strict log of activities. 
In case SSL is used to log on to HTTP based e-mail server, proxy 
can not be an issue because IP address of the client shall be 
recorded. Corporate proxy servers may not be strictly time 
synchronized as they may be using Network Time Protocol (NTP) 
and thus may impede the investigation. ISP proxy servers usually 
maintain a strict and time synchronized log (use STIME protocol) 
and have a clear devised policy to cooperate with the investigators.  
iii. The tracked IP address maps to some tunnelling server. In this case, 
tracking source of e-mail will be difficult because tunnelling may 
be done in different ways and some are not logged. 
iv. The IP address in the Received header field maps to SMTP server. 
In this case, the SMTP server log must be obtained. IP address may 
map to SMTP server belonging to ISP, or some corporate or an 
open relay. In all cases, logs stored must be obtained. If the logs are 
strictly time synchronized, then the sender can be tracked easily. 
ISP and corporate SMTP servers can provide further details about 
the particular user such as his contact details and credit card 
number. 
v. The IP address contained in the Received field resolves to 
Annomizers or re-mailers. In this case, investigators must obtain 
logs and original e-mail message from the anonymous SMTP or 
HTTP servers. Further, in case the anonymity is a paid service, user 
account details must also be obtained.  
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It is also possible to add one or more false Received headers in the data field of 
the message with an intention to freeze the investigation. Investigators must pay 
careful attention to all fields of the Received headers with respect to each other 
especially in terms of delivery methods and date & time. If the delivery methods 
vary or the time & date differ considerably, then false headers can be easily 
identified. Otherwise, the investigation shall have to investigate all IP addresses 
and request logs from all servers. It may be very difficult to track a sender from 
the IP address if the sender has tampered IP address at packet level (Ehrenkranz et 
al. 2009). Once the source of the e-mail message under investigation has been 
determined or some one is strongly suspected for being the source, his or her 
computer, e-mail client software, web browser, etc. are investigated for traces of 
evidence.  
5. CONCLUSION 
E-mail forensics, a specialized kind of network forensics deals with the 
investigation of content of e-mail messages to identify the actual sender, recipient, 
data and time when it was sent, etc.  It also involves investigation of source and 
destination systems and intermediate devices used for its delivery.  The header 
analysis is carried out on the content of e-mail message to determine its 
legitimacy. Spoofing, unauthorized networks open mail relays, annomizers or re-
mailers, open proxy, SSH tunnel or port-redirector, botnets and untraceable 
Internet connections are common approaches by which senders lie to recipients 
about their true identities. Various software tools which essentially perform 
automated header analysis and network device inspections have been developed 
to assist speedy investigations. These also include features for abuse reporting, 
support for multiple mailbox formats, e-mail classification, etc. It has been found 
that header fields of e-mail message that can directly reveal the identity of sender 
can be forged unless compatible security protocols are used at both sending and 
receiving servers. However, first received header of the message contains the 
original IP address of the computer used to send the e-mail message, which can be 
tracked to identify the sender. In case IP address contained in the first received 
field maps to some Internet resource, sender can be tracked by identifying its 
identity from the logs maintained by servers or various network devices.  
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